The other important point of the Sunningdale agreement, which drew Unionist opposition, was the issue of security and police policy. Mr. Faulkner and his party had hoped for more extradition powers, namely the transfer of all terrorism suspects to Northern Ireland, but the referral of the case to an intergovernmental commission was a „significant blow to Faulkner.“ He hoped that Sunningdale… a new extradition agreement that it could present as a political and security advantage. [16] This result significantly undermined Faulkner`s position and only fuelled unionists` distrust of his ability to defend the position of unionism vis-à-vis the British government. As for the work of the police, Faulkner had also not been at the head of the negotiations, and once again the established Unionists had failed to understand the importance of the practice on symbolism. The Council of Ireland, at the request of the SDLP, should have some power over how the RUC would be managed and, once again, while the Council would not become as powerful as agreed in principle in Sunningdale, „the mere existence of a Council was insulting“. [17] The 1998 Good Friday Agreement, on which the current system of decentralisation in Northern Ireland is based, is similar to that of Sunningdale. [5] Irish politician Séamus Mallon, who participated in the negotiations, called the agreement „Sunningdale for slow learners.“ This claim has been criticized by political scientists such as Richard Wilford and Stefan Wolff. The former said that „it`s… [Sunningdale and Belfast] have considerable differences, both in terms of the content and circumstances of their negotiation, implementation and implementation.“ [6] On December 9, a press release was issued announcing the agreement, which was later announced as the Sunningdale Agreement. The Sunningdale Agreement was an attempt to create a Northern Ireland executive and a cross-border council of Ireland. Signed on December 12, 1973 at Sunningdale Park in Sunningdale, Berkshire.

[1] The Unionist opposition, violence and a general loyalist strike led to the failure of the agreement in May 1974. The British Parliament passed the Northern Ireland Assembly Act in May 1973 and elections were held at the end of June. The Unionists closed with a healthy majority, winning 50 of the 78 seats in the Assembly, while the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) won 19 seats. However, there have been serious problems for the executive. There have been many disagreements between the parties in the Assembly and the role of the Irish Council has not been clearly highlighted. In addition, terrorist activities were ongoing in Northern Ireland and, although the police were controlled from London, the Northern Ireland Executive was held responsible. Anti-power unionists were outraged to see the Republic of Northern Ireland have a say and called for the agreement to be abolished. In the March 1974 general election, the anti-Sunningdale parties won 11 of the 12 Westminster seats. Chief Executive Gerry Fitt said people had not yet understood Sunningdale, referring to opinion polls that still had a majority in favour of the agreement on both sides of the community. Despite the election results, neither the Sunningdale agreement nor the executive was changed. In March 1974, trade union supporters withdrew their support for the agreement and asked the Republic of Ireland to repeal Articles 2 and 3 of its Constitution (these articles would not be revised until after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement).